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1998 Amendment to the U.S.-Japan Civil Air
Transport Agreement:
The Battle May Be Won, but the War
for "Open Skies" Is Far from Over
Gilbert Fisher
The United States and Japan took a significant step in liber-
alizing the Japanese civil air transport market by concluding
the Agreement Between the United States and Japan Relating
to and Amending the Civil Air Transport Agreement of August
11, 1952,1 which entered into force April 20, 1998. Prior to the
1998 Agreement, only two passenger airlines from the United
States and one from Japan, known as "incumbents," enjoyed
broad rights to travel between the United States and Japan and
beyond. 2 The 1998 Agreement equalized the treatment of both
countries' airline industries by allowing the designation of two
incumbents and four non-incumbents from each country.3 While
the numbers and opportunities of non-incumbents were signifi-
cantly expanded by the 1998 Agreement, it nonetheless may
have jeopardized the possibility of eventually negotiating a true
open skies agreement with Japan, which remains the ultimate
goal of the United States.
This Note examines the 1998 Agreement and how it trades
short-term expanded access to the Japanese market for any real
hope of securing the ultimate goal of establishing a true open
skies agreement with Japan.4 Part I outlines the importance
and potential of the Asian Aviation Market. Part II examines
the 1998 Agreement and the history of the negotiations that
lead to its formation. Part III looks at the short-term signifi-
1. Agreement Between the United States and Japan Relating to and
Amending the Civil Air Transport Agreement of Aug. 11, 1952, as Amended,
with Memorandum of Understanding, April 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL
320120 [hereinafter 1998 Agreement].
2. See Arthur J. Alexander, Transpacific Aviation Pact Yields Extensive
Opportunities, JEI REP. No. 7A, (Japan Economics Institute, Washington D.C.)
Feb. 20, 1998.
3. Id. at 10.
4. See Derek Lick, More Turbulence Ahead: A Bumpy Ride During the
U.S. -Japanese Aviation Talks Exemplifies the Need for a Pragmatic Course in
Future Aviation Negotiations, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1207, 1215 (1998).
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cance of the 1998 Agreement, and Part IV analyzes the Agree-
ment's long-term implications. Part V concludes that while the
1998 Agreement provides minor incentives for Japan to return
to the bargaining table when its four-year term expires5 , the
Agreement fails as a whole because it essentially gives Japan
everything it could gain from an open skies agreement. Japan
has only three major airlines, and each of them has gained
nearly unrestricted access to the United States market through
the 1998 Agreement.6 The Agreement leaves the United States
with little bargaining power in future discussions regarding the
further opening of the Japanese market.
I. POTENTIAL FOR GROWTH IN THE ASIAN MARKET
Notwithstanding the continuing economic hardships faced
in Asia, there exists a large potential for growth and develop-
ment of the airline industry in northeast Asia7 , as well as new
opportunities for U.S. carriers. South Korea and China are
building new airports, in addition to a new airport recently com-
pleted in Osaka, Japan.8 In addition, the demand for air travel
throughout the Asia/Pacific region grew at an average annual
rate of more than ten percent between 1985 and 1995, the high-
est rate for any region in the world.9
In spite of the financial crisis, which has affected a number
of Asian countries, the forecast for the long-term growth of air
travel in the region remains optimistic. 10 As recently as early
1997, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) fore-
cast an average annual growth rate of 7.4% in the demand for
air travel in Asia through 2010, a rate more than twice that for
the rest of the world." As a result, more than one billion passen-
gers per year will be traveling to, from and within the Asia/Pa-
5. Id. at 1255.
6. Id.
7. Northeast Asia includes China, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Hong Kong,
Japan, North and South Korea, Macau, Mongolia, and the Russian Federation
east of the Urals.
8. See Nisid Hajari et al., A Walk in the Clouds: The sleek lines of exciting
new airports in Hong Kong and Kuala Lumpur sketch a vision of how Asia and
the world will fly in the 21" century, TME IN'L, June 22, 1998, at 48+, available
in 1998 WL 11649161.
9. See Air Transport Action Group [hereinafter ATAG], Asia IPacific Air
Traffic Growth and Constraints (1997) at 3, (visited Oct. 29, 1998) <http://
www.atag.org/ASIA/index.htm>.
10. See Ian Jarrett, Into a new dawn, AsiAN Bus. (H.K.) Aug. 1, 1998, at 48,
available in 1998 WL 14068503.
11. Id.
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cific region by 2010.12 The region increased its share of
international scheduled traffic from 26.2% in 1985 to 36.2% in
1995, and forecasters see it reaching fifty percent by 2010.13 Ac-
cording to the forecast Japan will record a moderate growth of
4.4%, while China's total traffic will increase from 61.6 million
passengers in 1995 to 291.5 million passengers in 2010, a 373%
rise.14 Such a dramatic increase in Chinese air traffic means
that the domination of the Asian market by Japanese travelers
will continue to lessen through 2010.15
The current financial crisis in Asia has brought with it only
a slight readjustment of the long-term forecast, though some of
the immediate impact on the aviation industry in Asia has been
severe. 16 Aircraft manufacturers, such as Boeing of the United
States and Airbus Industrie of Europe, stand behind their pre-
dictions for continued strong growth, which they place at 6.5%
per year.17 In fact, by 2010, forecasts show some 1.1 billion pas-
sengers travelling within or to and from the Asian region-a
projected fifty percent of world travel in 2010, and a figure equal
to the total volume of world travel in 1995.18 In addition, new
airspace agreements involving Russia, Mongolia and North Ko-
rea have reduced flight times for direct flights between North
America and Asian destinations such as China and South Ko-
12. See ATAG, supra note 9, at 3.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 4.
16. See Jarrett, supra note 10, at 48. (In South Korea, the number two car-
rier, Asiana Airlines, has been forced to reduce its fleet, while Cathay Pacific of
Hong Kong, which consistently ranks among the world's most profitable air-
lines, has seen profits drop fifty-six percent in the year 1997, and it faced a
tougher year in 1998. Id. at 49. Philippine Airlines has suspended routes and
faces labor cuts and a forced reduction in the size of its fleets to survive, while
Indonesia's Garuda Airlines has been unable to stick to its delivery schedule of
twelve Boeing 737's, three of which sit ready and waiting at Boeing's plant in
Washington State. See Frederic M. Biddle and Diane Brady, Asian Airlines
Lower Growth Forecasts: Boeing and Airbus May Be Hurt by Economic Crisis,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1997 at B9B. Currency devaluations and a sudden slump
in passenger demand have hit when many Asian airlines were expanding their
fleets. Id. However, even though China's domestic airlines have piled up com-
bined losses of US$361 million in the first half of 1998, Ray Bracy, the president
of Boeing China Inc., says, "We know that this is not the primary time for air-
craft sales here in China." China: Sluggish market hits aviation operations,
CHINA Bus. INFO. NETWORK, Oct. 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13494744.
However, Boeing continues to forecast that nearly 1,800 aircraft will be needed
in China in the next 20 years. Id.
17. See Biddle, supra note 16, at B9B.
18. See Jarrett, supra note 10, at 48.
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rea.19 New alliances between American and Asian carriers also
promise to facilitate access to the growing Chinese market.20
Therefore, the Asian financial situation notwithstanding, the re-
gion's aviation market remains nearly unmatched in the world
for growth potential.
In order for the United States to take advantage of the po-
tential for growth in the aviation market throughout the Asia/
Pacific region, it must negotiate aviation agreements with each
country individually. International air traffic arrangements re-
main a complex collection of bilateral agreements not governed
by the multilateral regime of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), which generally governs international trade in goods
and services. 21 International aviation rights are categorized into
what are commonly called the eight "freedoms" of the sky, which
have been identified as the right of a civil aircraft or airline from
one country to 1) fly over the territory of another, without land-
ing, provided the overflown country gives its approval in ad-
vance; 2) land in the territory of another country for refueling,
maintenance or other technical reasons, as long as no commer-
cial passenger or cargo service is undertaken; 3) carry passen-
gers and cargo from its home country to another country; 4)
carry passengers and cargo from another country to its home
country; 5) carry passengers and cargo between two countries
not its home, as long as the flight originates or terminates in its
home country (often referred to as "beyond" rights); 6) carry pas-
19. U.S. airlines may now take advantage of an agreement with Russia and
Mongolia to offer direct flights with shorter flying times between the U.S. and
China by flying over the arctic circle and down to China across Russian and
Mongolian airspace. See Northwest Airlines to Become First U.S. Carrier to Op-
erate New Route Through Russian Airspace, Northwest Airlines News Archive,
Aug. 18, 1998 (visited Oct. 10, 1998) <http'J/www.nwa.com/corpinfo/newsc/1998/
pr081898b.shtml>. See also 2 Koreas agree to open airspace to allow flights, JA-
PAN T-ANsP. ScAN, Oct. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8250232 (noting that
airlines that fly between North America and South Korea have been able to
shave from 20 to 47 minutes off flight times by taking a short-cut across North
Korean airspace, due to an agreement which was implemented in April of
1998).
20. See Northwest Airlines, U.S. Partners, Form Alliances to Enhance U.S.-
China Services, Northwest Airlines News Archive, May 12, 1998 (visited Oct.
10, 1998). <httpJ/www.nwa.com/corpinfo/newsc/1998/pr051298a.shtml>
21. See Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Would Competition in Commercial Avi-
ation Ever Fit Into the World Trade Organization?, 61 J.AIR L. & COM. 793, 794
(May-June 1996). For a complete summary of the history and development of
the current bilateral system see Rebecca E. Kreis, A Comparative Analysis of
the Aviation Network Within the European Community and the Ad-Hoc Network
Between the United States and Central America, 24 TaANsP. L.J. 303, 305-313
(Spring-Summer 1997). See also Abeyratne, supra, at 795-809.
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sengers or cargo from one country to another with an intermedi-
ate stop in its home country; 7) carry passengers or cargo
between points entirely outside its territory; and 8) carry pas-
sengers or cargo entirely inside the territory of another country
(known as "cabotage").22 Because the United States must negoti-
ate for the eight freedoms of the sky with each country individu-
ally, specific agreements can vary widely from country to
country. 23
In 1944, the Convention on International Civil Aviation was
held in Chicago, and while the United States sought the unilat-
eral adoption of the first five freedoms, only the first two free-
doms were included in the Chicago convention, 24 which has
become the baseline for modem aviation agreements. An agree-
ment is considered an "open skies" agreement if it extends at
least the first five, if not all eight, of the freedoms of the sky.25
The United States' push to establish bilateral "open-skies"
agreements has gained momentum since 1992, when agree-
ments were first signed with Canada and The Netherlands. 26
The number of such agreements rose to nearly thirty by 1997.27
Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei, all of which signed
open skies agreements in 1997, were the first countries from the
Asian region to do so. 28
II. THE TERMS OF THE 1998 AGREEMENT
In January of 1998, the United States and Japan reached
an agreement to amend the Civil Air Transport Agreement of
1952 after nearly two years of "arduous negotiations."29 The
original 1952 Agreement allowed "[a]n airline or airlines desig-
nated by the [glovernment" of either the United States or Japan
to operate air services on specified routes.30 The 1952 agreement
between the United States and Japan granted the first through
22. See Kreis, supra note 21, at 308-309.
23. See Daniel C. Hedlund, Note, Toward Open Skies: Liberalizing Trade
in International Airline Services, 3 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 259, 264-265 (1994)
(discussing the bilateral nature of aviation negotiation agreements).
24. Id. at 265.
25. See Kreis, supra note 21, at 308 (describing the eight freedoms of the
sky).
26. See Brian Reyes and Chris Gillis, Bumpy flight toward open skies, AM.
SHIPPER 93, May 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10848781.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Alexander, supra note 2, at 1.
30. Civil Air Transport Agreement Between the United States of America
and Japan, Aug. 11, 1952, U.S.-Japan, 212 U.N.T.S. 60, 78.
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the fifth freedom rights to these designated carriers on specified
routes. 31 The designated carriers, also known as "incumbent"32
airlines, were Northwest and United 33 for the United States and
Japan Air Lines for Japan. 34 Federal Express became the sole
incumbent cargo-only carrier. 35
In the early 1980s, the United States argued that either
party could designate any or all of its airlines as incumbents,
"since the 1952 treaty explicitly used the plural, 'airlines.'"3 6 Ja-
pan countered that such an interpretation went "well beyond the
original intent of the agreement."3 7 Japan insisted that no addi-
tional airlines should be granted the same rights as the incum-
bents. Eventually, however, the United States and Japan
modified the original 1952 agreement through a series of Memo-
randa of Understanding (MOUs), to allow limited flights by non-
incumbents American, Continental and Delta Airlines of the
United States, and All Nippon Airways of Japan. 38 The flights
by U.S. "non-incumbent" airlines were subject to weekly fre-
quency limits, and they were denied any fifth freedom rights to
carry passengers or cargo beyond Japan.39
The disparity in the rights of the incumbent and non-incum-
bent airlines has had a significant economic impact on domestic
regions which have consequently enjoyed or been denied access
to Japan.40 Since the U.S. incumbent airlines primarily served
Japan from the American west and mid-west, the southeastern
region was left without easy access to Japan. The thirteen
31. Id. at 62.
32. The 1998 Agreement refers to both incumbent and non-incumbent
.combination" airlines. See 1998 Agreement, supra note 1, at 2 and 5. Combina-
tion airlines are authorized to operate combination passenger and cargo serv-
ices, while incumbent and non-incumbent all-cargo carriers are authorized only
to provide cargo services. Id. at 2 and 9.
33. While Northwest Airlines was an original incumbent, United
purchased its incumbent rights from the other original incumbent, Pan Ameri-
can World Airways Co., in 1986. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 4.
34. See Michael Goldman, U.S.-Japan Aviation Wars: Negotiating Not-
Quite-Open Skies, 12-SUM AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 6 (Summer 1997).
35. Federal Express obtained its incumbent rights to carry cargo when it
acquired Flying Tiger Line, Inc., which had been added as an incumbent cargo
carrier after the original agreement. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 4.
36. Alexander, supra note 2, at 4.
37. Id.
38. See Goldman, supra note 34, at 6.
39. Id.
40. See id. (noting that the U.S. Airports for Better International Air Ser-
vice (USA-BIAS) have calculated that an American city with a daily nonstop
flight to Japan benefits from Japanese visitor spending, local foreign invest-
ment and export related jobs in the amount of up to US$650 million per year).
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southeastern states and Texas make up thirty-three percent of
the total U.S. population, but only three percent of the nonstop
U.S.-Japan airline flights serve that region.4 ' Furthermore, in
spite of the additional flights subsequently granted to non-in-
cumbents, U.S. and Japanese incumbent airlines carry eighty
percent of all passenger traffic between the United States and
Japan.4 2 This market dominance stems from their preferred sta-
tus under the 1952 Agreement.4 3 The disparity between the in-
cumbent and non-incumbent airlines largely motivated the
latest push by the United States for modification of the aviation
agreement.4 The United States initially hoped to broaden the
scope of the previous Agreement into a complete open skies
agreement with Japan.4 5
From the beginning, Japan refused to accept an "open skies"
interpretation of the 1952 Agreement or to replace the current
understanding with a more explicit open skies agreement.4 6 As
is the case with other governments slow to implement open skies
agreements, Japanese reluctance "stems in part from the knowl-
edge that their inefficient, high-cost carriers cannot compete
with U.S. airlines, honed by now by years of fierce, deregulated
domestic competition."4 7 As a result of the highly regulated Jap-
anese domestic market, the operating costs of Japan's major air-
lines average sixty-six to eighty percent higher than those of
competing U.S. airlines.48 Even though bureaucrats from Ja-
pan's Ministry of Transport (MOT) concluded that the "only way
to motivate more efficient operations was through greater com-
petition," MOT negotiators envisioned a twenty-year time frame
as appropriate. 49
In addition to refusing to extend unrestricted rights to non-
incumbent airlines, Japan asserted that the "primary objective"
of the 1952 Agreement was to provide for direct traffic between
the United States and Japan.50 Therefore, Japan insisted that
passengers and cargo picked up in Japan and bound for other
destinations should not exceed fifty percent of the total "beyond
41. Id.
42. See Lick, supra note 4, at 1228.
43. Id. at 1229.
44. See Goldman, supra note 34, at 6.
45. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 4.
46. See Lick, supra note 4, at 1228-33.
47. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 5.
48. See Lick, supra note 4, at 1235.
49. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 5.
50. Id.
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traffic" aboard incumbent U.S. carriers. 5 1 Japan's objective-ori-
ented interpretation of the 1952 Agreement spurred its refusal
to approve new beyond routes for incumbent Federal Express in
particular. 5 2
In response to Japan's insistence upon a limited interpreta-
tion of beyond rights, the United States hoped to expressly clar-
ify that beyond rights were unlimited, in addition to securing an
open skies agreement. 53 Japan, on the other hand, viewed the
original agreement as unfair because three U.S. airlines enjoyed
incumbent status while only one Japanese airline enjoyed the
same. 54 Therefore, Japan's first priority became the negotiation
of an "equalization of rights."5 5 The resulting 1998 Agreement
seeks to accommodate all concerns on both sides. 56
The 1998 Agreement allows two airlines from each country
to fly from any city in their home country to any city in the
other's country and beyond, "without any limitation on fre-
quency or capacity, and with respect to traffic composition with-
out limitation except on passenger fifth freedom operations
.... Japan advocated the limits on passenger fifth freedom
51. Id.
52. Id. at 6.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 1998 Agreement, supra note 1 at 2. The 1998 Agreement limits fifth
freedom operations by establishing formulas to ensure that U.S. and Japanese
carriers do not exceed a certain proportion of their total passenger miles carry-
ing traffic originating in the other party's country to third countries in Asia or
the Americas. The passenger miles are aggregated on a system-wide basis over
a six-month period. Id. at 3. The first formula, as applicable to U.S. incumbent
airlines states, "Pax-miles (BC) <= pax-miles (AB) + pax-miles (AC)". Id. Where
pax-miles are passenger miles flown, A is the United States, B is Japan, and C
is any third country in Asia; this formula means that passenger miles from Ja-
pan to a third country in Asia must not exceed passenger miles between the
United States and Japan. See Alexander, supra note 2 at 10. A second formula
is "Pax-miles (AC) >= 25% pax-miles (BC)." See 1998 Agreement, supra note 1,
at 3. This formula requires that of the total passenger miles terminating in the
third country in Asia, the number of passenger miles from the United States to
the third country must be greater than twenty-five percent of the number of
passenger miles from Japan to the third country. See Alexander, supra note 2 at
10. A slightly different formula is used for traffic going beyond Japan to destina-
tions in Europe or Africa, "Pax-miles (BC) <= pax-miles (AC)." See 1998 Agree-
ment, supra note 1, at 4. In this formula, C is a European or African third
country, and the passenger miles on the Japan Europe [or Africa] beyond seg-
ment must be less than the passenger miles of the people flying from the United
States to Europe [or Africa]." See Alexander, supra note 2 at 10. The same three
formulas also apply to Japanese carriers flying to the United States and beyond
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operations from the start. The final formula, however, which is
based on passenger miles rather than passenger counts, ap-
pealed to the United States. "Since the distances and the fares
from the United States to Japan are considerably greater than
those for Asian beyond routes, [and the agreed upon] formula
would favor American carriers," the United States had a valid
reason for demanding a formula like the one implemented. 58
In addition to allowing each country two designated incum-
bent airlines and establishing an explicit compromise position
on beyond rights, the 1998 Agreement also deals with non-in-
cumbent passenger airlines, codesharing agreements between
airlines, and both incumbent and non-incumbent cargo carri-
ers.59 Japan and the United States may each designate four
non-incumbent passenger airlines to operate between the two
countries, and each country may add a fifth non-incumbent in
the year 2000.60 The non-incumbents receive additional non-re-
stricted and restricted frequencies. 61 According to the 1998
Agreement, each country's non-incumbents may split twenty-
eight additional round-trip frequencies "regardless of any re-
strictions on designations or frequencies on those city-pair mar-
kets under the prior agreements." 62 Another forty-two round-
trip frequencies are allotted to each country's non-incumbents,
except in certain city-pair markets. 63 Finally, non-incumbents
are entitled to reallocation of frequencies provided to incum-
bents in prior agreements. 64 These would total twenty un-
restricted frequencies. 65
In the area of incumbent all-cargo services, Japan did not
achieve the same equalization under the 1998 Agreement that it
had insisted on in passenger services.66 The 1998 Agreement
provides for designation of two Japanese airlines and three U.S.
airlines as incumbent all-cargo airlines, namely Japan Airlines
to third countries in the Americas or to European/African destinations. See
1998 Agreement, supra note 1, at 4-5.
58. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 7.
59. Id. at 10.
60. Id.
61. See 1998 Agreement, supra note 1, at 6.
62. Id.
63. Id. The restricted city-pair markets are Tokyo/New York (not including
Newark, New Jersey); Tokyo/Chicago; Tokyo/San Francisco (not including Oak-
land, California); Tokyo/Los Angeles; Tokyo/Honolulu; Tokyo/Guam-Saipan;
Osaka/Los Angeles; Osaka/Honolulu; Osaka/Guam-Saipan; Nagoya/Honolulu;
and Fukuoka/Honolulu. Id. at 6-7.
64. Id. at 7.
65. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 11.
66. See 1998 Agreement, supra note 1, at 9.
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and Nippon Cargo Airlines for Japan and Federal Express,
Northwest Airlines, and United Airlines for the United States. 67
Each country is allowed to designate one additional all-cargo
airline beginning in 2002.68 Cargo operations from both coun-
tries are "without any limitation on frequency, capacity, or traf-
fic composition," and no formulas for restricting fifth freedom
rights apply to incumbent all-cargo services.69
Two U.S. all-cargo non-incumbent airlines were authorized
by the 1998 agreement to operate frequencies previously
granted.70 United Parcel Service (UPS) is allowed to operate
from any point in the United States to two points in Japan and
two points beyond, while Polar Air Cargo will operate from any
point in the United States to any two points in Japan and any
one point beyond.71 Both countries are allowed to designate one
additional non-incumbent all-cargo airline in 2002.72
The 1998 Agreement also includes provisions for coopera-
tive marketing arrangements such as codesharing.73 While bi-
lateral codesharing between Japanese and U.S. airlines is
unrestricted, the agreement also provides for third-country
codesharing with either party to the agreement, if the third
country also allows codesharing arrangements with the airlines
of the other party to the 1998 Agreement.74 Originally, Japan
sought to completely ban codeshare arrangements between air-
lines of the same country, arguing that in a case such as the
Continental/Northwest alliance this would essentially allow a
non-incumbent, Continental, to the enjoy all of the benefits of its
incumbent partner, Northwest.75 The compromise on same
country codesharing in the 1998 Agreement provides that part-
ner airlines of the same country may operate twenty-eight
67. Id.
68. Id. at 11.
69. Id. at 9.
70. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 11.
71. Id.
72. See 1998 Agreement, supra note 1, at 11.
73. Id. at 13. A codesharing agreement is a form of alliance whereby one
airline sells seats on a partner airline's flight using its own two-letter code
designation. See Kreis, supra note 21, at 313. Through codesharing, an airline
can prepare an itinerary using its own flight numbers, even though one or more
segments of the flight will be flown with a partner airline. This results in "a
more favorable computer display when consumers look to purchase their tick-
ets." Id. "There are many benefits from these links. The first and foremost is
access to restricted markets. Following this are increased revenues, lower costs,
new traffic, and "seamless" service." Id.
74. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 11.
75. See Lick, supra note 4, at 1257.
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weekly round-trip frequencies under their codesharing
arrangements. 76
One final significant issue dealt with in the 1998 Agreement
is a provision for future negotiations. 77 The United States ini-
tially sought an open skies agreement with Japan, and it was
reluctant to agree to anything that did not provide for further
liberalization in the future.78 As a result, the 1998 Agreement
contains a provision that further negotiations must begin no
later than January 1, 2001, "with the objective of fully liberaliz-
ing the civil aviation relationship between Japan and the United
States."79 The provision states that if the parties fail to reach an
agreement by January 1, 2002, "additional opportunities shall
become available."80 The additional opportunities include seven
new round-trip weekly frequencies available to non-incumbent
passenger airlines in each of the years 2002, 2004, and 2005.81
III. THE SHORT-TERM SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
1998 AGREEMENT
The United States, backed by the incumbent airlines, ini-
tially sought nothing short of a complete open skies agreement
with Japan.8 2 The incumbents pushed for an open skies agree-
ment, even though they enjoyed broad rights under the 1952
Agreement, because they feared they might end up with fewer
rights if the Japanese succeeded in their position to limit beyond
rights.8 3 The non-incumbent airlines, on the other hand, even
with more to gain from an open skies agreement, supported a
compromise, because they feared the talks could drag on indefi-
nitely, and felt that getting something would be better than
nothing.8 4 Eventually, only Northwest, whose incumbent status
helped the airline control one-third of all U.S.-Japan flights,
held out in opposition to a compromise.8 5 The airline was ac-
cused of holding out for open skies simply to preserve its large
76. See 1998 Agreement, supra note 1, at 16.
77. Id. at 18.
78. See Lick, supra note 4, at 1254.
79. See 1998 Agreement, supra note 1, at 18.
80. Id. at 19.
81. Id.
82. See Lick, supra note 4, at 1246.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 7-9.
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market share as an incumbent, since "bly insisting on the unat-
tainable, the status quo was assured."8 6
When the final deal was struck, however, the United States
gained more than expected, as the main airline beneficiaries
were U.S. carriers, and each of the U.S. airlines involved, except
Northwest, benefited significantly. 7 Even Northwest arguably
got something, however, since liberal beyond rights were explic-
itly set forth in the 1998 Agreement, and also because North-
west is allowed the benefit of its same-country codesharing
arrangement with Continental as well. 8
At the announcement of the 1998 Agreement, both Japan
Airlines, an original incumbent, and All Nippon Airways (ANA),
which was newly elevated to incumbent status, were disap-
pointed.8 9 Even before the 1998 Agreement, the greater cost effi-
ciency of the U.S. airline industry in general had given U.S.
carriers a competitive edge that helped them acquire a majority
share of the U.S.-Japan traffic. 90 In fact, while the United States
has had a growing trade deficit with Japan overall, the U.S.
economy has had an annual trade surplus of over five billion dol-
lars per year in the aviation sector.9 1 In reaching the 1998
Agreement, the Japanese government hoped that their nation's
airlines would be given an incentive to become more efficient, as
this "kind of 'tough love' may be in the long-term best interest of
the industry and certainly of the Japanese flying public and
shippers."92
Even with the closing of the 1998 Agreement, significant im-
plementation obstacles needed to be cleared before any real ben-
efits could be realized. Regardless of the 1998 Agreement's route
and frequency guarantees, the final factor controlling whether a
U.S. airline-incumbent or not-can actually add flights is the
availability of takeoff and landing slots at Japanese airports.9 3
Well before the 1998 Agreement was finalized, "it was apparent
that the number of desired flights to and from Narita9 4 exceeded
86. Id.
87. Id. at 11.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Lick, supra note 4, at 1223.
91. See Goldman, supra note 34, at 6.
92. Alexander, supra note 2, at 12.
93. Id. at 10.
94. See generally Dave Knibb, Narita Slots Scramble, AIRLINE Bus. 28,
Aug. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11817282. (noting that Narita International
Airport, which serves Tokyo, is the third busiest airport in Asia, and is used by
more than half of all passengers en route to or from Japan).
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the airport's theoretical capacity."95 Northwest had warned that
"additional frequencies granted without the slots to back them
up were only 'paper rights.' ' 96
While the question of slot availability did not become an ex-
plicit part of the 1998 Agreement, Japan's Ministry of Transport
(MOT) quickly devised a plan to satisfy the U.S. carriers in order
to make the deal a success. 97 Through reallocating unused
slots98 and raising slot limits,9 9 the Japanese MOT has created
some two hundred new slots at Narita since the 1998 Agree-
ment.10 0 Japan's airlines have complained that the United
States-whose share of Narita's total slots went from thirty-four
percent before the 1998 Agreement to thirty-seven percent af-
ter' 0 1 -controls far too great a share already. 10 2 The opening of
a second runway at Narita, planned to be completed in 2000,103
will increase capacity by seventy-two percent, allowing for 260
more takeoffs and landings each day.10 4 Competition for this
new capacity is sure to be fierce.105
IV. THE LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF
THE AGREEMENT
While U.S. airlines seem to have clearly won benefits for the
life of the 1998 Agreement, it is less clear whether the Agree-
95. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 10.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Japan adopted a "use it or lose it" rule, whereby unused slots allo-
cated to one airline might be taken away and reallocated to another airline of
the same country. Id. Federal Express had a number of unused slots, but rather
than take them without compensation, the Japanese MOT allowed Federal Ex-
press to transfer them to other U.S. airlines for compensation. Id.
99. See Knibb, supra note 94, at 2. Narita's airport authority secured an
agreement with Japan's air traffic controllers union to allow an increase in the
hourly rate from twenty-eight to thirty takeoffs or landings. Id. The three-hour
limit was raised from seventy-five to seventy-nine and the daily limit from 360
to 370 takeoffs or landings. Id.
100. See JAL, United Defend Narita Slot Situation, Push O'Hare Bids, AVIA-
TION DAILY 52, Jan. 11, 1999, available in 1999 WL 9481645. The measures for
the accommodation of more slots for U.S. airlines under the 1998 Agreement
has drawn criticism from third party countries, particularly the United King-
dom, claiming that the United States has been given preferential treatment.
See Knibb, supra note 94, at 3.
101. See JAL, United Defend Narita Slot Situation, supra note 100, at 52.
102. See Knibb, supra note 94, at 2.
103. See Andrzej Jeziorski, JAL realigns to face aggressive market, FLIGHT
IN'L Jan. 27, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10230685, at 3.
104. See Knibb, supra note 94, at 1.
105. Id.
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ment provides any advantage in reaching the long-term goal of
achieving open skies. Japanese airlines were disappointed in the
1998 Agreement when it was announced because they viewed
the agreement as exposing Japanese carriers to too much com-
petition, too soon. 106 In fact, shortly after the 1998 Agreement
was announced, Standard and Poor's justified the airlines' dis-
appointment by placing Japan Airlines on its watch list for pos-
sible downgrading. S & P cited the increased competition Japan
Airlines would face as a result of the 1998 Agreement, the new
runway opening in Narita, and also the carrier's high cost struc-
ture in justifying the downgrade.107 In addition, ANA com-
plained that while the Japanese MOT had found additional slots
for U.S. non-incumbents, "its new status as an incumbent...
[would] remain largely symbolic," unless more slots were given
to ANA.108
In spite of the negative consequences that concerned Japa-
nese carriers under the terms of the 1998 Agreement, Japan Air-
lines returned to profitability in the 1998-99 fiscal year, and the
airline predicted it would be able "to pay its first shareholder
dividends in six years."10 9 In addition, Japanese and U.S. air-
lines have reached a number of codeshare agreements provided
for in the 1998 Agreement. 110 Moreover, when the new runway
opens at Narita, Japanese airlines are expected to be awarded
half of the new landing slots.1 1'
If Japanese airlines are able to improve their cost structure
and overall competitiveness, the picture is even brighter for Ja-
pan.112 By a three-to-one margin, Japanese travelers prefer to
106. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 11-12.
107. See S and P puts JAL on watch list for possible downgrade, JAPAN
TRANSP. SCAN, Mar. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8030637, at 1.
108. See Knibb, supra note 94, at 1.
109. See Jeziorski, supra note 103, at 3.
110. See Profile: Japan's Air Transport Industry (Feb 1999), ASIA PuLsE,
Feb. 9, 1999, available in 1999 WL 5084464, at 6. Japan Airlines has reached a
codeshare agreement with American Airlines. See JAL and AA reach agree-
ment, JAPAN ENERGY ScAN Mar. 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9326831, at 1.
ANA has announced an agreement with United. See ANA announces tie-ups
with United, Lufthansa, JAPAN TRANsP. ScAN Mar. 16, 1998, available in 1998
WL 8030630, at 2. In addition, Japanese non-incumbent Japan Air System
(JAS) has formed an alliance with Northwest. See Northwest Airlines Uses Flex-
ibility Afforded by the new US.-Japan Aviation Agreement to Restructure its
Asia Route Network, July 20, 1998, (visited October 10, 1998) <http'/
www.nwa.com/corpinfo/newsc/1998/pr072098a.shtml>.
111. See Lick, supra note 4, at 1262-1263.
112. The increased service between the United States and Japan as a result
of the 1998 Agreement has lead both Japanese and U.S. airlines to cut fares,
and the competition has forced at least one newly designated non-incumbent,
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fly on Japanese airlines, a significant factor, considering Japa-
nese travelers and other foreign nationals make up over eighty
percent of the passengers traveling between the United States
and Japan. 113 It is also important to note that Japanese airlines
also have an advantage in dealing with Japanese tour wholesal-
ers due to the structure of the Japanese travel market." 4
V. CONCLUSION
While U.S. airlines, especially the designated non-incum-
bents, may have realized substantial gains through the com-
promises reached in the 1998 Agreement, the struggle for an
open skies agreement and its concomitant benefits is far from
over. Furthermore, while Japanese airlines came away from the
1998 Agreement expressing disappointment, cutting costs and
improving competitiveness will place them in a very advanta-
geous position for the long term.
The vast majority of travelers between the United States
and Japan are Japanese. This large group of travelers prefers
Japanese airlines over foreign carriers, and with the leverage
Japanese carriers enjoy with Japanese domestic tour wholesal-
ers, the United States must yet surmount a significant obstacle
to ensure its position in the Japanese market.
In spite of the gradually increasing frequencies guaranteed
by the 1998 Agreement, if the latest agreement expires without
a new one to take its place, the United States has little leverage
to bring the Japanese back to the bargaining table, since all of
Japan's major carriers now enjoy broad rights under the equali-
zation extended by the 1998 Agreement. 1 5
In addition to U.S. bilateral efforts for open skies, there is a
possibility of a multilateral effort for the same. The European
Commission is bringing an action against eight member states
for negotiating bilateral open skies agreements with the United
States claiming the Commission has a mandate to "negotiate a
Trans World Airlines, to postpone its entry into the Japanese market. See Japa-
nese and US Airlines Cut Economy Class Fares, AIRLIN INDus. INFo., Feb. 24,
1999, available in 1999 WL 10468519, at 1.
113. See Lick, supra note 4, at 1263.
114. Id.
115. Japan has only three major airlines which account for nearly 90 per-
cent of domestic market share and two of them are incumbents, while the third,
Japan Air System, has a codeshare agreement with U.S. incumbent Northwest.
See Profile: Japan's Air Transport Industry (Feb 1999), supra note 110, at 6.
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comprehensive EU-U.S. aviation agreement. 116 Japan is not a
member of any economic union, however, and while there has
been talk of eliminating the bilateral regime of aviation agree-
ments and bringing it under the World Trade Organization, na-
tional interests keep this a long way in the future. 117 Therefore,
the United States will probably have to negotiate any further
liberalization on a bilateral basis, without much incentive for
Japan to cooperate.
The United States should have bargained for a more certain
open skies outcome. Part of an effective strategy for securing
open skies agreements includes assigning the "highest priority
to negotiations that seek to open markets, and a lower priority
to those that seek a continuation of bilateral restrictions.""' ,
The United States should avoid wasting efforts on negotiations
seeking "only incremental changes using a traditional balance of
benefits approach."" 9 Experience shows that even if these nego-
tiations break down, the United States may not be seriously dis-
advantaged, and the benefits of success are worth the wait.120
A number of U.S. airlines benefited from the 1998 agree-
ment, but the United States retained little leverage to bring Ja-
pan back to the bargaining table for further liberalization. For
this reason, even though the United States may have won the
battle with the 1998 Agreement, the war for open skies is far
from over.
116. See John R. Schmertz and Mike Meier, EU Brings Action Before ECJ
Against 8 Member States Over Their 'Open Skies"Agreements With U.S., 4 Int'l
L. Update 135 (Nov. 1998). The EC brought the action against Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.
117. See generally Abeyratne supra, note 21.
118. See Michael F. Goldman, Modest Proposal for a Short-Term U.S. Inter-
national Aviation Negotiation Strategy, 8-WTR Air & Space Law., Winter 1994,
at 6, 11.
119. Id.
120. Id. "Over the last decade, the United States has come to live with com-
ity and reciprocity regimes [after being unable to negotiate] with Brazil, Thai-
land, Peru and most recently France." Id. "No shutdown of airline services
resulted in any of these cases." Id.
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